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I.  Introduction
Two decades ago a discussion of the interactions between expenditure on
the welfare system and labour market changes would have focussed on the
impact of changing unemployment levels. Today, the unemployment-
welfare expenditure link is still important but another factor has been
added. Increasingly welfare policy discussions are focussing on the
relationship between wage changes and welfare payments.  There are three
important recurring themes.
First, the labour market has been generating wage falls among the
low paid and changing the financial balance between low wages and social
security benefits. After long periods of high unemployment, particularly
long term unemployment, questions are increasingly raised as to whether
a significant proportion of unemployment may be attributable to
unemployment benefits that are too generous relative to employment at
low wages.
Second, there are increasing calls to adopt labour market policies to
weaken centralised wage fixing and unions and, in this way, encourage
low wages to fall further. In order to avoid the rapid growth of the
working poor that may result from these initiatives, it is often suggested
that labour market deregulation policies should be accompanied by
income subsidies for the low paid.1 Under these circumstances, the
demands on the social security budget will grow and there may be pressure
to divert an increasing share of resources away from the unemployed
towards those employed at low pay.
Third, if low wages fall and there is an inadequate employment
response, poverty will increase. The combination of unemployment, and
low wages when employed, will severely affect the ability of the poor to
escape poverty.
Now that there is an increased interest in the interaction between
wages and social security policy it seems natural to take the next step. This
would involve combining the changes in employment and wages to focus
on changing labour market income and to tease out some of the
implications of the large changes that are occurring.  Changes in labour
market income can be an important contributor to changes in poverty.  
There are many dimensions along which changing labour market
income could be explored. We choose to direct attention to the changes
that are occurring among males of different ages.  The changes in Australia
                                                
1 Wage subsidies should be thought of as part of the social security system whether the
subsidy is paid directly in cash through the Department of Social Security or as an
income tax credit paid by the Department of Taxation.
2are very large. Changes of a similar magnitude are occurring in the UK
and similar, but smaller, changes are observed in the US.
The paper is structured as follows. Part II provides some general
background. It compares Australian changes in the distribution of male
wages with changes in the UK and US.  The US can be thought of as an
unregulated labour market that perhaps describes the direction in which
Australia is moving. The UK is particularly interesting because it has
followed a policy of labour market deregulation and since many UK labour
market institutions were similar to ours the experience there might be
particularly relevant.
Part III widens the discussion beyond wages to employment and
draws attention to the large changes that are occurring in male labour
market income across different age groups.  It focuses on wage and
employment changes and documents the growing loss of labour market
income among the young. We conjecture about some of the implications
of these changes.
Part IV returns to the international context and compares the
Australian labour market income changes across different age groups with
the changes that are occurring in the US. It adds an employment
dimension to the large US literature on wage inequality (see Levy and
Murnane, 1992).
Part V offers concluding comments and speculates on the
importance of these large changes for social security policy.
II.  The International Setting
Male Pay Inequality in Australia, UK and the US
It is generally thought that the wage distribution narrowed within OECD
member countries during the fifties, sixties and early seventies.  Since the
mid to late 1970s, however, there has been a break in this trend. The wage
distribution has stayed much the same or widened (OECD 1993). A subset
of English speaking countries—Australia, the US and UK—are especially
noticeable. Their pay distributions have widened considerably and the
trend is continuing.2
To illustrate these changes we begin as follows.  First, weekly
earnings of male full-time wage and salary earners in each of our three
countries are ranked from the lowest to the highest. Then we calculate
weekly earnings at each decile boundary. There has been some difficulty in
accessing UK data before 1983 so for consistency the series for each country
                                                
2 There is now some evidence that the pattern of change is becoming increasingly diverse
across countries. The pay distribution in Canada has narrowed over the last five to ten
years along with that of Finland and Germany (OECD 1996).  The pay distribution has
probably widened in NZ also but the data do not extend over a sufficiently long period to
be useful for us.
3begins at that date. The focus is on weekly earnings because the Australian
data do not allow an accurate adjustment for hours worked.3
The degree of pay inequality is very different across these three
countries.  In 1995, for example, a male employed in Australia and placed
at the 90th percentile of the adult male full-time full-week pay distribution
earned 2.76 times that of a male at the 10th percentile (Table 1). In the UK
the distribution was considerably wider and the ratio was 3.70 or 34 per
cent more than in Australia. In the US the pay distribution is wider again
and the pay ratio is 4.64, or 68 per cent more than the Australian ratio.
Among English speaking countries Australia exhibits the most
compressed pay structure but the degree of compression is not unusual
when measured against European experience.
Table 1
Male Full-Time, Full-Week Earnings Ratios
Australia, United Kingdom & United States of America
Earnings Ratios 1976 1983 1995
90/10 percentile
Australia 2.26 2.43 2.76
UK – 2.75 3.70
USA 3.36 4.00 4.64
10/50 percentile
Australia 0.72 0.68 0.62
UK – 0.62 0.50
USA 0.52 0.45 0.44
15–19 years/35–44 years
Australia 0.48 0.46 0.40
UK – 0.40 0.31
USA 0.38 0.33 0.31
Source: Australia, Weekly Earnings of Employees (Distribution), ABS Cat. No. 6310.0
US, Current Population Survey (March)
UK, General Household Survey
Changes in the pay distribution are indicated by changes in the ratio
between full-time weekly earnings at the 10th and 90th percentile. These
ratios are set at unity in 1983 for each of the three countries in our sample
and the data smoothed by a two year moving average (Figure 1).
Since 1983 inequality of male weekly earnings has continued to
increase in each of these countries.  The smallest change in male wage
                                                
3 The data are collected from household surveys in each country. The Australian data are
from Weekly Earnings of Employees (Distribution) ABS Catalogue number 6310.0.  The
US data are from the Current Population Survey (March). The UK data are from the
General Household Survey.
4inequality has occurred in the US and Australia. Their experience has been
very similar. The pay gap has widened about 13 per cent in Australia and
16 per cent in the US over thirteen years. It is not too difficult to conjecture
as to reasons for a widening pay gap in the US.  The labour market there is
relatively unfettered by unions or wage regulations and, in principle, the
wage distribution is free to change quickly in response to shifts in demand
and supply.  It appears as though there has been a shift in demand towards
more educated and more experienced workers, not adequately matched by
changes in supply, and the returns to experience and education have
increased. In addition variation of earnings in each age and experience
category has increased (Freeman and Katz 1995).
The steady increase in male wage inequality is more difficult to
explain in Australia. Until recently Australian policy placed considerable
emphasis on compressing the pay distribution by increasing pay levels of
the low paid. There has also been an extensive system of wage regulations.
Unlike the US, education returns have remained relatively stable but
there has been a large shift in the returns to experience and the variation
of earnings in each age group and education category has increased.
In the UK the change in inequality has been very large, 34 per cent
over the twelve years of data.4 As in the US there has been a shift in
demand towards more educated and experienced workers. But it appears
that the important policy initiatives in the 1980s that changed the nature
and relative power of labour market institutions had a substantial effect.
As a result of Margaret Thatcher’s policies unions were weakened and pay
setting decentralised. This created the pre-conditions for low pay to fall and
high pay to increase in response to changing demand and supply patterns.
Among all OECD countries the change in pay inequality has been largest in
the UK.
The trend towards low pay
The marked trend towards more pay inequality can be produced by a
widening earnings gap between the median and the bottom or between the
median and the top of the pay distribution.  To focus more on low
earnings Table 1 presents data for the gap between the 10th percentile and
the median.
The difference in the level of male low pay relative to the median is
considerable across these countries. The success of Australian institutions
in achieving pay compression is clearly evident. In 1995 a male employed
full-time in Australia and placed at the 10th percentile of the weekly
earnings distribution receives considerable more per week than his UK
and US counterparts. The ratios are 0.62, 0.50 and 0.44 respectively. These
are quite large sums. In Australian 1997 dollars the income gaps in favour
                                                
4  The UK questionnaire was redesigned in 1992. It is possible therefore that there may be
a break in the data between 1991 and 1992. In any event the larger increase in inequality
was already apparent in the UK before 1992 (see Schmitt 1995).
5of Australia are $79, relative to the UK, and $119 per week, relative to the
US.
The widening pay gap between the median male weekly earnings
from full-week full-time work and the 10th percentile of the male pay
distributions are plotted in Figure 2 where the data have been smoothed by
a two year moving average.  It is noticeable over this period that in each
country there has been a fall in male low wages, relative to the median. In
the US the fall has been slight, about two per cent.5  Most of the growing
inequality of male wages in the US over this period has been the result of
increased wages at the top of the wage distribution.  In Australia, the fall in
male wages has been approximately 9 per cent and the decline has occurred
steadily throughout the period.  In the UK the fall has been very large,
approximately 15 per cent. The marked contrast between the UK data and
that of Australia and the US suggests that labour marked deregulation in
the UK during the late 1970s and early 1980s may have had a substantial
effect, especially during the recession period that began in 1990.
Against this background we turn to a more detailed analysis of the
Australian data. The next section focuses on wage and employment
changes by age group and documents changes in labour market income.
III. Life Time Effects and the Changing Distribution  of Labour
Market Income among Australian Males
The Background
Individuals support themselves with income from many sources.  They
access labour market income from full and part-time work, private income
from capital, within family contributions and government income
through transfers such as Austudy, social security benefits and pensions.
The balance among these income sources changes through life.  For young
males, family transfers and government benefits are very important. For
males in the middle age groups the labour market dominates as an income
source.  For older males government and family transfers once again
become important income sources.
It would be useful to document how income sources change as
individuals become older and how the balance has been changing over
recent decades. We could then explore some of the implications for the
role of social security and the nature of Australian society. That task is a
large one, however, and as a first step our attention is directed to the
changing importance of labour market income over the lifetime of males.6
                                                
5 Over the longer period 1976-1997 the fall in male low wages has been about the same in
the US and Australia (Gregory, Martin and Klug 1998).
6 The calculations are very rough and the data are not very rich but, nevertheless, the
calculations should provide a good indication of the changes that are occurring.  It would
not be too difficult to extend the analysis to document the large increases in government
6The framework for the exercise is illustrated as follows. If there is a
steady state the age-labour market income profile might be represented as
an inverted U shaped relationship.  This relationship is generated
primarily by two sets of factors.
The first contributor is that wages usually follow an inverted U
shape across cohorts.  Wages first increase with age as workers acquire
more experience and are promoted up job ladders. The average wage for
prime age males, for example, is usually about twice as high as the teenage
full-time wage. Among older males, before retirement, the full-time wage
often begins to fall. Where hourly wages depend on effort the amount of
effort offered by the worker may begin to decline. Another reason is that
those who lose employment in these age groups often experience
considerable difficulty in finding a new job that pays as well as the old job.
The wage-labour market experience profile (which is closely approximated
by the age-wage relationship) is extremely well researched in economics
(see Murphy and Welch, 1990).
The second contributor to the inverted U shape is that involvement
in labour market activity changes over the life-time. Young males have a
higher incidence of unemployment and more involvement in education
so the full-time employment-population ratio is lower than that of the
average male in the middle age groups.  Once the employment-population
peak is reached, older males begin to retire and the age-labour market
income profile declines steeply.
In the absence of a steady state, and when the economy evolves
through time, there are other forces that twist and change the relationship
between age and labour market income. Once again there are two forces
that have been particularly important. The first contributor to a twist in
the relationship over the last few decades has been a tendency for the
young to become increasingly better educated. Increasing levels of
education may be expected to generate wage and employment effects that
change the age-labour market income profile. There are three education
effects that might be expected to steepen the profile:
  (i) As the young attend education institutions their ability to be
involved in the labour market during these years is diminished and
their full-time employment-population ratio will fall.
 (ii) Investment in education increases wages at later ages and more
educated workers face steeper wage-age profiles that deliver the rate
of return for their investment in education.
(iii) If the group choosing to become better educated is
disproportionately drawn from those who would have earned
relatively high wages when young then there is a composition effect
that lowers the average wage of the young.  
There is one education effect that might flatten the profile. When
better educated workers enter the workforce they may earn more during
                                                                                                                                           
income transfers. This would require shifting the analysis to the Income Distribution
Surveys of 1982, 1986, 1990 and 1994-95 (Borland and Kennedy 1998).
7the transition period than the older cohort in front of them. As the
education levels of the young increase parts of the age-earnings profile
may become flatter.  The net effect of the increased education levels among
the young is an empirical issue but it seems that on balance the age income
profile should steepen.
The second contributor to changes in the age earnings profile in the
absence of a steady state may be productivity gains which increase average
wages through time. If productivity increases are age neutral then the age-
labour market income profile is lifted by productivity increases. An
important reason why middle aged workers earn more than when they
were young, for example, is that everyone earns more as a result of wage
increasing technical change.  Of course, if technical change is not neutral
with respect to age the age-income profile will twist. Thus, if technical
change moves against the young and in favour of more experienced
workers the curve will steepen.
Not a great deal is known as to the way in which changes in the
relationship between age and labour market income impacts on society.
Most of the economics literature has focused on the wage-age profile.  The
interactions among employment and wage changes and the macro
implications are relatively under explored.
It is likely, among OECD economies, that when the age labour
market income profile steepens there are more income transfers from the
middle age groups to those at either end of the age distribution. These
income transfers may be effected through many different agencies.
The income flow can occur within the family.  In the US parents
often begin saving for their children’s university education when the child
is born. When the young male is at university the income flows are often
substantial. In a similar vein the family may contribute to the support of
its aged members.  
The income flow can also be facilitated by the state which may
collect taxes from the middle aged and distribute some of the income to
the young, in the form of unemployment benefits and subsidised
education, and to the old, in the form of disability benefits, pensions and
health services.
The Empirical Calculations
All the forces discussed in the previous section have been operating to an
unusual degree in Australia and for expositional purposes we place them
into three sets; (i) relative and real wage changes across age groups, (ii)
changes in the relative employment-population ratio and (iii) the changes
in the labour market income.
Relative and Real Wage Changes across Age Groups
The Australian hourly wage data is not as good as we would like so we
begin with weekly earnings of males who work full-time. Figure 3 presents
8the change in male real earnings from full-time employment for different
age groups over the period since 1976.  There is a consistent pattern.
Between 1976 and 1984 real earnings of the middle age groups increased
only slightly relative to the young and no age group experienced
significant real wage increases.  But since the early 1980s the wage gap
between the age groups has increased in favour of the middle age group
and moved against the young. The fall in full-time earnings of males 15-19
and 20-24 years, relative to full-time weekly earnings of males 35-44 year
olds, is of the order of 17 per cent.  In addition, the peak earnings age group
has become older and moved from the 35-44 year old category to the 45-54
year old age category.
There is clearly a very large twist in the age earnings profile —
reducing the pay of young males and increasing that of the middle age
groups. This twist presents something of a puzzle.  Consider the shift in
terms of demand and supply.  The size of different age groups has been
changing in Australia and the population of the younger age groups has
not grown significantly over the last twenty-five years.  Between 1976 and
1997 the population of young males, 15-19 years, increased 6 per cent.  The
population of males, 35-44 years, increased 75 per cent and the increase for
the 45-54 year old group was 53 per cent. Other things being equal, the
pattern of population growth suggests that there should be a shortage of
young workers and an excess supply of older workers and the wages of the
young should increase relative to the middle age groups.  
This type of argument became popular among US economist when
analysing the effects of the baby boomers moving through the age
structure of the US population.7  And yet, in Australia, the increase in
relative demand for older workers has not only accounted for the increase
in the population of older workers but gone further in that the
employment changes, particularly for full-time workers, has magnified the
population changes.
There is a another aspect to the puzzle of the falling wages for the
young. Although the young are better educated than older workers this
has not increased the wages of the young relative to workers in the older
age groups.  Indeed, until the last few years the real wage of the younger
age groups fell.  Once again the evidence suggests a twist in the demand
patterns for male employees to favour the older more experienced
workers.
It is not clear why this twist has occurred despite the changing
labour supply patterns.  Similar twists have occurred in the UK and the US
but their emphasis seems to have been directed towards the widening
differential by education categories.  Much more seems to be happening
which has largely escaped attention.
                                                
7 Welch (1979) concludes that the evidence is very direct: as work experience distributions
shifted toward increased proportion of young workers their relative wages fell. This
result does not seem apparent in the Australian data. There is no evidence of wage rises
as the young age groups fall in numbers relative to older age groups.
9The impact of this twist on real wages of different age groups will
depend in the extent to which the age-earnings profile has shifted upwards
over the years in response to technical change. During the 1950s, 1960s and
1970s the upward shift in the age-earnings profile was considerable. The
average growth of male real wages averaged 28 per cent per decade. Over
the 1980s, however, accumulated real wage growth was 6 per cent. The
slow down in real wage growth has been extraordinary. Since 1976 the total
per capita increase over two decades has been the equivalent of an average
three year increase during earlier decades. The scope for the average real
wage increase to offset any adverse real wage effects of the twist in the age-
earnings profile therefore is quite limited.  The slight growth in average
real wages, provides on opportunity for substantial falls in real wages for a
significant number of men. It also opens the possibility that many young
Australian males at the bottom of the wage distribution may be worse off
in economic terms than their fathers were when they were young.
Employment and age
The changing pattern of employment among males, and particularly
among full-time workers, reinforces the changes that are observed among
earnings.  Those groups with the largest fall in weekly earnings have been
subject to the largest falls in full-time employment, even after taking
account of population changes.  This suggests that the employment
changes are predominantly being driven by demand shifts across age
groups.
Figure 4 plots the full-time employment-population ratio for each
age group in 1976.  The same general inverted U shape is evident as in the
wage-experience profile.  The change in the pattern of full-time
employment since 1976 is quite exceptional.  In every age group full-time
employment has fallen but the largest falls have been among the youngest
and oldest age groups. The employment-population ratio fell 56 per cent
for the 15-19 year old group, 28 per cent for those 20-24 year old and 14 per
cent for those 25-34 years.
Part-time employment has provided some offset to the loss of full-
time employment. Part-time employment is growing among those groups
which have lost full-time employment but in no instance does the growth
in part-time jobs offset the full-time employment loss.
The changing relationship between Age and Labour Market Income
Labour market income is the product of employment and wages. Age
groups with falling employment levels have also lost real and relative
labour income when employed.  This suggests that the changes in labour
income across age groups might be very large indeed. We begin with
labour income from full-time work.
For each year since 1976, when the earnings data first became
available, an estimate of aggregate full-time employment income for each
age group is calculated as the product of the number of full-time employed
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persons and average weekly income from full-time employment. We
begin with full-time employment because, as indicated earlier, the
reduction in the full-time employment population ratio has been quite
remarkable.
Next, aggregate full-time employment income is divided by the
number of men in each age group. This produces an estimate of the per
capita labour market income of all men in the age group whether
employed full-time or not. The data are expressed in 1997 prices and to
keep the analysis simple no allowance is made for income taxes.
The changes are exceptional (Figure 5). At each end of the age
distribution there are considerable falls in real per capita full-time
employment income. Consider young men first. For those 15-19 years per
capita full-time employment income has fallen by 60 per cent or $96 per
week over the 1976-1997 period.  For young men, 20-24 years, the fall is 32
per cent or $149 per week.
The fall in full-time employment income is not confined to the
very young. For those 25-34 years the income fall is $93 per week.  Then,
for men between 35 and 54 years the income fall per week is marginal.  For
those 60-64 years the weekly income fall is $129.
The importance of these large income falls from full-time
employment can be further illustrated by the following calculations.
Suppose the 1976 and 1997 cross section data are treated as though they
were taken from a hypothetical steady state. That is, the average income
observed in each age category in 1976 is assumed to describe the future
stream of income from full-time work of a young male aged 16 years.  This
assumption is then used to calculate the amount of market income from
full-time work that will pass through the hands of a young male between
his 16th and 20th birthday (Table 2). From the 1976 cross section the
aggregate income flow over these 5 years would be $42,000.  From the 1997
cross section data the aggregate income flow would fall to $17,000.  This is a
fall of 60 per cent or $25,000. The same calculation can be done for the
other age groups (Table 2).  The income falls for young males are very
large.  By 25 years of age, for example, the accumulated income loss is
$64,000 and by 34 years the loss is $112,000.
Such large falls in the full-time labour market income of young
males may be a large part of the driving forces for some of the social
changes observed among young males. It is quite clear that the ability of
young males to accumulate income from full-time work to finance
household formation, for example, or to support children has fallen to a
very large degree.  Their ability to separate themselves financially from
parents has weakened.  The insecurity generated by real wage and
employment losses might be expected to be considerable. The reality
approximated by these data explains the oft heard remark that, on average,
young men today cannot expect to be as well off as their fathers, at least in
terms of their ability to earn their way from full-time work. To the extent
that they are able to maintain a higher standard of living the money must
come from somewhere else.
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Table 2
Labour Market Income - Males in Full Time Employment
Australia 1976-1997
Age Group:
15-19 20-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-59 60-64
Labour Market
Income per capita
weekly income
dollars
     1976 162 461 652 681 650 552 374
     1997   66 312 559 679 650 489 245
     Difference -96 -149 -93  -2    0  -63 -129
Accumulated Labour
Market Income per
capita ($000)
     1976  42 162 501 855 1193 1337 1381
     1997  17  98 389 742 1080 1207 1232
     Difference -25 -64 -112 -113 -113 -130 -149
Between 35 and 54 years the further reduction in the average
income level is small but it is clear that there is no clawing back of this
income loss among the young.  For the older age group the income losses
begin again.  A further $17,000 is lost between 55 and 59 years and another
$19,000 between 60 and 64 years.  Over this hypothetical working life time
the income loss is around $149,000.
To what extent are these income losses offset by the increase in part-
time employment. Part-time employment has been increasing, particularly
for young males where it accounts for more than half their employment.
For all men the proportion of jobs that is part-time is now around 12 per
cent. The same empirical exercise as above is used to calculate changing
income from part-time employment.  
The published income data from part-time work are not very
extensive. As a first approximation to the missing data we take the ratio of
part-time to full-time weekly earnings for each age group from 1981 data
which was obtained from the ABS before the new charging practices of the
ABS made the analysis of unpublished data so expensive. This ratio is
applied to average full-time earnings in each age group to calculate a part-
time wage. The product of part-time employment and the part-time wage
produces an estimate of part-time employment income.
Part-time work has become an important source of income for the
young and on the basis of these rough calculations provides teenage males
with approximately one third of their labour market income and for those
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in the 20 to 24 year old age group the proportion is 13 per cent. For the
other age groups the contribution of part-time employment is quite small.
The growing importance of part-time employment income does not
offset the loss of full-time employment income (Table 3).  Furthermore, to
the extent that part-time work has become important for men it implies a
different type of labour market involvement; an involvement with few
fringe benefits or with long term career prospects.
Table 3
Labour Market Income - All Males
Australia 1976-1997
Age Group:
15-19 20-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-59 60-64
Labour Market
Income per capita
weekly income
dollars:
     1976 169 475 658 694 665 573 375
     1997  90 354 483 704 677 523 304
     Difference  -79 -121  -75  10  12 -50 -71
Accumulated Labour
Market Income per
capita ($000):
     1976  43 167 509 870 1216 1356 1414
     1997  23 115 418 784 1136 1272 1303
     Difference -20 -52 -91 -86   -80   -93 -111
Although these calculations are rough approximations they capture
and illustrate the large changes that are occurring.  A more thorough
analysis would take account of the following.
First, our calculations are based on average data. It is not difficult to
imagine a more sophisticated analysis that might take into account the
changing distribution of labour market income within each age group.  In
addition, it is well known that the distribution of employment
probabilities is not random within and across each age group.  The
unemployed tends to be drawn disproportionately from those socio-
economic groups where the average wage is falling.  It is also likely that a
higher probability of job loss through life tends to follow those who have
experienced significant unemployment spells. These more complicated
calculations may well indicate that for young males with low market
income the gap between their income prospects now and the income
prospects of their fathers at the same age may well be widening against the
young.
13
Second, the hypothetical life-time earnings calculations which are
produced to illustrate the large changes that are occurring are based on a
steady state assumption.  For some purposes a cohort analysis which
follows individuals though their life time may be preferable but the
difficulty is that insufficient time has passed since these large changes
began. The data show, however, that because the changes have continued
over this period the steady state assumption applied each year understates
the degree of change that is occurring. If anything the shift in income
between the young and middle age groups calculated from a cohort
analysis is greater than that suggested by our calculations.
Third, at this point an important part of the story is missing. When
income transfers occur within the family the transfers are from the family
to the young rather than from the father alone.  We need to document the
labour market income changes that are occurring among mothers and
other members of the family to put together a comprehensive picture of
the large changes that are occurring.
Women have been subject to similar labour market changes –
labour market income is also redistributing towards the older age groups
but with two important differences. One difference is that labour market
incomes over this period have been falling for women under 25 years, as it
has for males under 25 years, but all other female age groups are
experiencing increases in labour market income. The other difference is
that over the steady state lifetime the labour market income of women has
increased substantially. This  suggests that one of the important sources of
income redistribution within the family may well be between middle aged
women to their children over 16 years who in previous times may have
had access to labour market income.
IV.   Returning to the International Setting
A considerable part of the changing age-labour market profile might be
explained by the poor employment growth in Australia.  It might be
worthwhile, therefore to look at the US data, as among OECD countries
the US has experienced the strongest employment growth over this
period.
Figure 6 plots the change in real average full-time labour market
income per capita for each US male age group between 1976 and 1995, and
between 1976-1997 for Australia.  For all age groups under 35 years male
labour market income has fallen in real terms, although the losses have
been slightly less than in Australia.  For the 15-19 age group the loss in
income is 44 per cent.  For the next age group, 20-24 years, the loss is 30 per
cent. It is only after 35 years of age that male real labour market income is
higher in 1995 than in 1976. As in Australia the largest increase in per
capita income is in the 45-54 year old age group. Despite the different
history of employment growth of the two countries there is a very similar
pattern of income change.  
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We can also calculate the changes in accumulated labour market
income assuming a steady state in 1976 and 1995 (US) and 1997 (Australia).
These calculations also produce similar results across the two countries. In
the US the average loss of accumulated labour market income by 34 years
of age is $70,000 (an 18 per cent loss between 1976 and 1995) and it is only
after passing 45 years of age that the 1995 accumulated labour market
income exceeds that of the 1976 cross-section.  Over the working lifetime
the increase in male labour market income is 3 per cent.
V.  Concluding Comments
We have documented very large changes in the distribution of male
labour market income across different age groups. The age labour market
income profile is twisting markedly and becoming steeper. Is this a source
of concern? It all depends on the process producing these changes.
Some of the change is being generated by increased education
participation of the young depressing their employment opportunities as
they study.  This process would not be regarded as a bad outcome although
higher education levels increase the pressure on all families to redistribute
income to their children. This education effect, however, cannot explain
falling relative wages and employment for males 25-34 years. Indeed
increased education levels might be expected to increase the wages and
employment levels of this group8.
Some of the twist in the age-labour market income profile may be
the result of the poor macro performance of the Australian labour market.
In an environment of insufficient jobs the young suffer most from lack of
employment. Their wages begin to fall as excess supply is increasingly
concentrated on the group.  This experience is very evident over the
employment cycles.  During each recession young people lose a
disproportionate share of full-time jobs and during each recovery phase
their employment does not recover.
Finally, the new labour market patterns suggest that poverty may be
increasingly concentrated on particular groups.  For example, if the young
become long term unemployed and when employed they are paid
relatively low wages their poverty cycle is not broken by employment. An
earned income tax credit that pays additional income to those with
children does nothing to help alleviate the poverty for the childless
worker.  
What is the next step and why might these results be of interest for
the development of social security policy and the evolution of Australia
society?  
First, these results suggest that for the young to maintain their
living standards, relative to the middle age groups, they need to access
                                                
8  Of course more education reduces the labour market experience of this group which ceteris
paribus, will depress income but, on balance within this age group, the positive income
effects of additional education predominates.
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income from somewhere else other than the labour market.  The two
obvious sources are government and the family.  
Over the last fifty years or so governments have increasingly
accepted responsibility for income transfers that in previous times were
the province of the family.  There has been some questioning as to
whether these trends should continue and there is some evidence that
government is attempting to reduce it’s responsibility.  Australian
governments, for example, have introduced more extensive family
income testing before providing young adults with income support such
as unemployment benefits. Family income testing for education support
for young adults is also being extended.
In the US the discussion as to the conflict between the state and the
family is more vigorous and extreme but similar debates can be found
here.
Second, to the extent that the young are increasingly being forced on
to the family for income support, the income of the family and the attitude
of the senior family members towards intra family income transfers
become increasingly important. Young males are losing some of their
ability to be independent of their parents as the need for intra-family
income transfers may become more important.
Third, these trends suggest that the scope for inequality to be
perpetuated across generations may be increased.
Fourth, one source of income for males is access to female income
either through transfers from working mothers to young males to from
female partners.  
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Figure 2: Male Weekly Earnings Index
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Figure 3: Males Employed Full-Time
Index of Real Weekly Earnings by Age
Australia 1976-1997
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Figure 4: Males Employed Full-Time
Employment to Population Ratio by Age
Australia 1976 and 1997
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Figure 5 - Males, Australia, 1976-97 Difference in FT Real Per Capita Average Labour Market Income 
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